In the first weeks of 2026, Greenland has emerged as a political flashpoint between the United States and its European allies. Recent US statements have warned that Greenland is strategically exposed, citing Russian activity in the Arctic and questioning whether existing arrangements are sufficient to protect the island. These claims have been accompanied by renewed American pressure on Denmark and rhetoric revisiting the idea of US control or even annexation of Greenland.
“The world is not secure unless we have Complete and Total Control of Greenland”, US President Donald Trump wrote in a recent letter to the Norwegian prime minister.
Read charitably, the concern is straightforward. Greenland occupies a critical position for US missile defence, early warning, and control of the North Atlantic approaches. Intercontinental ballistic missiles pass over or near the island en route between Russia and North America. At the same time, melting ice caps are drawing increasing attention to Greenland’s resources and surrounding sea lanes.
Russia has expanded its military activity in the Arctic, while the United States and Denmark have significantly reduced their permanent presence on the island since the end of the Cold War. US personnel numbers have fallen from over 10,000 at their peak to roughly 150 today. Against the backdrop of a deteriorating European security environment, Greenland may appear from Washington as a vital asset guarded by limited forces and complex political arrangements.
The problem is that this debate has unfolded largely in political terms, with little attention paid to Russia’s actual ability to operate militarily against Greenland. When Russian naval capabilities and NATO control of the North Atlantic are examined in detail, the image of Greenland as a plausible target for Russian military operations quickly falls apart.
What follows is an assessment of capability and logistics rather than rhetoric or intent, based on publicly available information. It focuses on Russia’s ability to insert and sustain forces on Greenland and does not deny that Russia can contest NATO presence through submarines, long-range strikes, or sabotage.
Russian Amphibious Capability
Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s amphibious lift capability in the High North rested with the Northern Fleet and consisted mainly of two Ivan Gren-class and four Ropucha-class landing ships. Together, these vessels could transport roughly 2,000 troops with equipment in a single lift.
During the war, this capacity has been sharply reduced. One Ivan Gren and two Ropucha-class ships were redeployed to the Black Sea, and one of the redeployed Ropucha-class vessels, Olenegorsky Gornyak, was damaged by Ukrainian attacks. As a result of these transfers, Russia’s available amphibious lift in the High North has been cut roughly in half. Under current conditions, Russia could likely deploy fewer than 1,000 troops in a single amphibious operation.
Even in a best-case post-war scenario, Russia would struggle to conduct operations larger than a brigade without drawing assets from other fleets, a slow and highly visible process. Regardless of force size, any landing force would still be constrained by Greenland’s geography and the requirement to sustain operations across vast distances.
Supplying Operations on Greenland
Any Russian operation against Greenland would require crossing nearly 2,000 kilometres of sea from bases around Murmansk through an environment under constant NATO surveillance. Reaching Greenland’s southern or western coasts would require transiting the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap, monitored by British and allied submarines and air forces operating from Norway, Iceland, the United Kingdom, and Greenland itself. Even if an initial force were able to pass through before open hostilities, sustaining or reinforcing that force would be extraordinarily difficult. In practice, these constraints limit any Russian operations to Greenland’s eastern coast.
This area of Greenland is extremely sparsely populated, even more so than the western coast. Tasiilaq, the largest settlement, has around 2,000 inhabitants, while Ittoqqortoormiit, the second-largest, has fewer than 400 and only minimal port facilities. Seizing such settlements would offer little strategic value. They are separated from Greenland’s administrative and military centres by hundreds of kilometres of ice, tundra, and mountains, with no supporting infrastructure.
Once Russian forces were ashore, any attempt to supply or reinforce them, including the use of civilian or auxiliary vessels, would almost certainly be intercepted by NATO air and naval forces, even without direct US involvement. Russia would also be unable to provide sustained air support at such distances, leaving any foothold exposed to NATO airpower. Even if some supplies reached the coast, the limited port infrastructure would severely restrict reinforcement.
In short, even a successful landing of a multi-battalion force would result in isolated forces incapable of threatening the NATO installations concentrated on Greenland’s western coast.
Airborne Options
Airborne operations face even greater obstacles as Eastern Greenland lies at the outer limit of Russia’s practical airborne range. While Il-76 transport aircraft might theoretically reach the island from the Kola Peninsula, they would operate without fighter escort and likely transit near or through NATO-controlled airspace. This would leave them highly vulnerable to interception.
Even if airborne forces were inserted successfully in conjunction with amphibious forces, the Russian operation would still face the same sustainment problems as before. The outcome would not change, except for the number of Russian troops stranded on the island.
The NATO Perspective
These constraints are not symmetrical. NATO operates at far shorter distances and maintains control of the North Atlantic. Canada and the United States can airlift forces to western Greenland within hours, while European NATO navies can operate freely without facing comparable Russian air threats.
Although Russian submarines pose some risk, penetrating the GIUK Gap has been a persistent challenge for Russia since Soviet times. There is little reason to believe this has become easier. At the height of the Cold War, over 10,000 US personnel were stationed in Greenland under conditions of uncontested air and sea control. That control remains, while Russian capabilities have declined significantly since the end of the Soviet era.
Should the security situation change, Denmark and its NATO allies retain the ability to rapidly reinforce Greenland with additional permanent or rotational forces. Recent European deployments to the island, as of January 2026, demonstrate that such reinforcement can be conducted on short notice without significant logistical difficulty.
Conclusion
The portrayal of Greenland as vulnerable to Russian military operations is difficult to reconcile with military reality. Russia’s ability to operate against the island is sharply constrained by geography, logistics, and enduring NATO control of the North Atlantic. These constraints are structural and geographical. Even at the height of the Soviet Union, threatening Greenland would have been extremely difficult. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s capacity for power projection this far west in the Arctic has only declined. Building a more robust capability would take years, during which NATO could easily respond.
If Russia sought to generate pressure in the Arctic, more accessible targets with fewer logistical constraints exist closer to Russian territory, such as Svalbard. Russia can still contest NATO presence around Greenland through submarines, long-range strikes, sabotage, or special forces, but these capabilities have long been known and are likely already incorporated into NATO planning.
Once these constraints are taken seriously, the idea of Russian military operations against Greenland ceases to appear credible and instead resembles a convenient narrative used to justify the expansionist US rhetoric.
Excellent piece, thank you