The proposed peace initiative for Ukraine, driven by the United States, has been widely criticised as immoral and at odds with international law. These arguments are valid, but they do not address the central issue: a settlement that fully aligns with international norms would require a complete Russian withdrawal. Under current conditions, that is not a realistic expectation.
Instead any agreement that is based on the current military realities will naturally place Ukraine at a strategic disadvantage and further erode the rules-based international order. As things stand, there is no indication that the West, especially Europe, or Ukraine has either the political will or the means to prevent such an outcome.
The origins of the peace proposal remain unclear. Reporting suggests that parts of it were shaped within US policy circles and other parts by Putin’s special envoy Kirill Dmitriev. Some reports state that Steve Witkoff and J. D. Vance are the main drivers on the US side, but it is uncertain which elements of the US administration initially endorsed the initiative or whether Ukrainian policymakers had substantive input. According to other reports the draft is fundamentally similar to some of the plans the Russians have suggested earlier to the Trump administration.
The draft includes fundamental structural flaws. It references outdated security frameworks rather than present mechanisms. It proposes constraints on European defence without granting Europe corresponding agency. It suggests reintroducing Russia into international formats without enforceable accountability. It clearly indicates that the United States expects to profit from Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts. Security guarantees are presented as a core component, but in their current form they cannot be considered reliable.
Much of the public debate around the draft has, however, focused on the moral and legal implications. While understandable, this framing does not reflect current battlefield realities. Ukraine has largely remained on the defensive since the failure of its 2023 counteroffensive and the 2024 Kursk operation that did not yield durable results. Throughout 2025, Russian forces have advanced at a pace of over 400 square kilometres per month. Ukrainian manpower constraints are deepening, desertion rates are rising and the current defensive posture is a result of necessity, not strategic choice.
Western support has not been scaled to meet the challenge. Assistance remains insufficient to shift the operational balance and the current US administration is in parts openly hostile to the Ukrainian cause. The expectation that Russia would reach exhaustion has so far proven incorrect. Russia continues to absorb losses and retains mobilisation capacity that currently exceeds Ukraine’s.
Without a major change in Western policy, Ukraine is unlikely to regain the initiative. Based on the current state of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, it is even possible that Russian gains will accelerate rather than remain linear. Looking six to twelve months ahead, it looks unlikely that Ukraine’s negotiation position will significantly improve. Instead, should Russian advances continue, Ukraine’s leverage will diminish further.
However, Ukraine still retains a functioning military and continues to inflict losses on Russian forces. Continued fighting may slow the pace of Russian advances and prevent complete operational collapse, but it is unlikely to reverse existing territorial losses. The ability to remain in the field does not translate into improved negotiating leverage if the broader balance continues to shift against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, on the homefront Ukraine is also entering a period of increasing economic strain. The budget for 2026 and 2027 will rely heavily on external financial support simply to maintain basic government functions and sustain the war effort. Without substantial European backing, Kyiv will face significant fiscal shortfalls that could affect both military capacity and domestic stability. It seems that resolving this issue demands Europe to release tens of billions of dollars in assets frozen from Russia, a move that the countries holding those assets have been so far unwilling to do. At the same time, the government is managing a high-profile corruption scandal, which risks weakening public trust and is also complicating European attitudes towards Ukraine.
In these circumstances, Russia has little incentive to accept a settlement that merely freezes current lines, as continued offensive action offers the prospect of further gains over time. Economic pressures may affect Russian capabilities in the long term, but they are unlikely to alter this calculation in the near term.
Given this, demands for territorial concessions, for example, while politically and morally difficult as reflected in public debate, should be understood as an outcome of the existing power imbalance rather than a fair or voluntary trade. Under current conditions, Ukraine is not exchanging territory for sustainable security but losing ground through attrition. Without a significant shift in the course of the war, further territorial losses may occur by force even without an agreement.
A common truism in warfare is that fighting ends when negotiations become the least worst option for both sides. Negotiations only become meaningful once the participants have more to gain on the negotiating table than on the battlefield. At the moment Russia has reason to assume that continued fighting will bring it additional advantages, which reduces its incentive to accept compromise. Meanwhile Europe presents itself as a strong actor trying to shape the negotiations in Ukraine’s favour but does not have the leverage to steer the process. Both the United States and Russia are currently able to largely sideline Europe in the negotiations.
If Ukraine’s supporters lack a clear strategy to materially strengthen Ukraine to the point where further Russian advances are no longer expected, they are only buying time before having to accept a resolution that reflects the current battlefield realities.
Strategically, the situation aligns with the core tenets of realism: those who hold power set the terms, those without it are expected to accept them. Acknowledging this does not make the outcome just. It reflects the negotiation environment as it stands.
None of this means that Ukraine lacks room to negotiate or must simply accept the terms brought to the table last week. It’s also not clear that negotiating under the current framework will lead to the best possible outcome. For example, lasting stability would require robust and binding Western security guarantees, but those outlined in the original draft are neither clearly defined nor credible.
Nevertheless, under present conditions any realistic settlement is likely to be fundamentally unjust. It would disadvantage Ukraine, legitimise territorial gains made through force and weaken the rules-based international order. The determining factor is not law or preference but relative power. Without a major shift in Western strategy, Ukraine is likely to be pressured into a peace that is favourable to Russia and not grounded in justice. This is not moral or preferable, but it is simply the most likely outcome given the current trajectory of the war.
Really well put. Ukraine does face a structurally deteriorating position - on the battlefield and at the negotiating table.
As Thucydides has famously said: "The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must".
It's interesting that Europe, despite being largely sidelined in these negotiations, remains a core strategic actor - one willing to provide security to Ukraine in a post-war setting. I wonder if there are any plans from the European side to intervene in a more forceful way to secure its own interests - especially if major concessions remain part of the peace framework going forward.